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# The Ontology of Withdrawal (3):

## The Vibrant Voices of Ambience Through ISHIMURE Michiko

**UENO Toshiya**

—Abstract

This section addresses literary texts written by Ishimure Michiko 石牟礼道子. In the first section (Ueno, 2018), I have already analyzed some passages by Jean Genet to articulate ontologically the notion of withdrawal in both things and humans. This section, with a similar intention, also explores Ishimure's literary works from several perspectives. How does Ishimure's ecocritical discourse contribute to the elaboration of ontology of withdrawal?

In the literature and critical discourses of the Postwar Japan, no one can deny the excellence of the prominent poetic reportage of *Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow* (苦界浄土) by Ishimure Michiko. The reportage is quite a renown document and expressions of thoughts and feelings on the fatal or tragic effects of the accumulation of organic mercury inside sea creatures (fishes, shells, and so on) through a complicated food chain.

How can Ishimure's style, (that surprisingly combines the methods of documentary or oral history with poetic or fictive writings), develop further the idea of tactical withdrawal and isolation along with the potential collectivism in her engaged politico-cultural initiatives: militant activism of mine workers in the late 1950s in Kyushu area, feminist popular literary movement, and literary digging of anonymous tacit voices of folklore in the everyday life, etc. She was also so close to Tanigawa Gan 谷川雁, the the legendary, notorious, leftist intellectual, and she was involved in his engaged social movement on publishing small-zines about political and workers activism in the late 1950s under the rubric of what was known then as "circle movement" (サークル運動). (I have once written a paper about Tanigawa in the bulletin of this faculty).

In her writings, Ishimure emphasized both singularity and anonymity (impersonality). Her style was (sur-) documentary—a genre invented and conceptualized by Hanada Kiyoteru in the late 1950's and somehow common among leftist intellectuals at that time, including Ishimure, Morisaki Kazue (森崎和江) and her partner, Tanigawa Gan (谷川雁). Her writings move between fiction and non-fiction, oral-history and literature, inventions and documentations, etc. Her cultural involvements in the zine called 無名通信 (the Journal of Pseudonym) in the late 1950's needs to be analyzed thoroughly and the ontological questions within her writings answered.

In the section (1) of this series of essays, I've referred to some readings of the works of the French philosopher François Laruelle. His non-philosophy has been read and interpreted as a kind of precursor of Speculative Realism (SR) and Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO). But recently, both Laruelle himself and Anthony Paul Smith (Paul Smith, 2016), who introduced him, draw on the issue of ecology in the ontological level. It is not difficult to understand the reason why ecology requires a certain ontology through the recent discussion of Anthropocene. Nature or mother earth has drastically been changed after the appearance of human species and especially the monstrous deployment of technology since the industrial revolution. On the one hand, the earth layers have been contaminated with artificial things, objects, materials, gadgets, technologies, particles and even radioactive isotopes; while on the other hand, the temporality of the world itself includes the archi-history of the planet on the other hand, a part which is to be called the *world without us* in the recent philosophical debates. (Thacker, 2011)

The Japanese edition of *Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow* was translated by Livia Monnet, a Canadian scholar from Montreal who actually has been a friend of mine for more than 20 years. Her translation of Ishimure is definitely tour de force. But it is a bit complicated to evaluate to what extent the term 'paradise' is justified for general readers. 'Paradise' might not be the suitable word as a translation for the Buddhist term Jyodo 浄土; this word has a highly Christian tone; it lacks the allusion to sanctity and utopia.

*Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow*, generally, has been read and interpreted through the vision of humanism. But this doesn't mean that Ishimure's discourse is identified with humanism and anthropocentrism. This essay introduces some conceptual twists of reading for the era of the Anthropocene in order to envision her works not so much in the light of humanism as in the perspective of the "non-human turn" or "post-human turn" through inhuman agencies. In other words, my paper seeks the possibility of raising the notion of *humanism via non-humanism* or *in-humanism*. The humanism in this context implies a posture of denying and rejecting a theological value, from whatever it might be derived. The notion of non-human or inhuman, however, is not simply invoked as the negation of humanism, but rather as an occasion of relocating the human within other non-human agencies in the same transversally ontological platform and as a potential which transcends the conventional ontological cosmos or symbolic order. Everything must be installed on the same platform. That is exactly one of crucial points for the recent currents of speculative philosophy.

In fact, Ishimure herself confessed her feelings of shame towards her own presence as a human being (Ishimure, 1990, 139). Put differently, Ishimure's works could not to be simply treated as discourses on accusations or indictment against irresponsible corporative pollutions through literary expressions. Her literature holds something more than a critical response to environmental disasters. It is known that there is a genre called "social or political documentary" that indicts the injustice of corporative firms for environmental pollutions, the hopeless treatments by our government, and the physical sufferings of citizens in local areas of Japan. Her works, however, cannot merely be subsumed in the genre of documentary.

The section aims to clarify by exploring the question: how can we re-read and re-interpret her *Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow* after/along with the events of 3.11? The massive turmoils in

the everyday life after the incident seemed for us a repetition of history—the Minamata Disease, that Ishimure addressed. The nuclear catastrophe and its ongoing tragi-comedic aftermath compel us to re-think ecologically over, not only our own lives but also to ask: What is Nature under/after suffering from various kinds of pollutions or contaminations as well as how we humans could actually affect the natural environment?

Originally, the term ‘Sea of Sorrow’ as used for the title of her work indicates the sufferings of both natural environment and human society in the Minamata area of the South Island, Kyushu, of Japan. But, in fact, the term Kugai 苦界, in Japanese conveys another layer of meaning. It is written also as 公界 in the same phonetic pronunciation that implies both the public sphere and the suffered or repressed zone as a marginal site in the anthropological sense. After the paradigm shifts within historicism over the concept of social history (enabled especially by Amino Yoshihiko, 網野善彦), the notion of liminal public sphere as Kugai has been elaborated. As is well known, even Ghibli anime such as Princess Mononoke was very much inspired by this socio-historical vision. It is noteworthy that an incipient form of the public sphere in Japan had been derived from the marginal, repressed, discriminated and suffered part of the society. In this sense, the phonetic overlapping of the term is intriguing, even if it's just a case of coincidence. Because Ishimure was so aware of the fact that so many migrant mine workers and residents were living and working in her organo-mercurially polluted area.

In Ishimure’s writings, for instance, we readily recognize many expressive and vivid descriptions of varied nonhuman agencies: insects, worms, fishes, shells, cats, snakes, seaweeds, plants, and so on—while keeping radical and critical views against both Japanese government and corporations. Her writings retain not only empathetic or sympathetic emotions to them, but also affords a meshed plane of effects within both Nature and technological surroundings in which a mutually inclusive disjunction emerges between nonhumans and humans; where an opposition or duality between being and thinking, subjects and objects, human and Nature, etc, no longer make sense. When her texts addresses living spirits or the souls in all living beings, or even the corpse of a human body as an object or thing, human existence unwittingly shift their own territory into non-human realms and inanimate sphere.

‘There is a living spirit in every tree, in every weed, in every blade of grass. Fish and earthworms, all living beings are endowed with a soul which stays behind and enters a new life when they die.’ (Ishimure, 1990, 260)

‘The newspapers wrote that Yuri (one of patients of Minamata Disease whom she had known and interview) was a beautiful puppet without a living soul’. (ibid.)

Certainly these lines could be interpreted as a kind of animism. Actually, even in the contemporary life of Japan, especially in its rural parts such as the South-West archipelagoes or the deep mountain sites of the East-North areas, these places have kept long traditions and habits of shamanism, animism and spiritualism. Interestingly it has nothing to do with the people’s religious faith nor their backgrounds, but instead it is more concerned with daily routines of ritual practices. For instance, the Buddhist ritual requiem for broken needles by housewives or clothing factories could be raised as an example.

In a different context, she addressed the presence or emergence of her own spirit. It appears in one of her late essays. In 2013, she fell in her place after she finished to write some articles for the local newspaper (Ishimure, 2014). The ambiguous or indecisive cognition of becoming a bird or butterfly after some incidents have intensively caught her. She felt as if her soul or spirit were exiting out from her body as a physical presence. The spirit leaving from the dead body is sometimes represented by the figure of insects or other species in the folklore or daily conversations in Japan archipelagoes. It is somehow quite a widespread and prevailing idea in Japan, that the spirit of a dead body could appear as butterfly or hermit crab, etc.

In my view, her prose does not just endorse the premodern type of animism or spiritualism, but rather unexpectedly reveals similarities with some concepts in contemporary thoughts and philosophy including Guattarian Ecosophy, SR and OOO, among others. Firstly, in Guattarian perspective, it can be said that machines and technology are always destined to a certain catastrophe or process toward ruin. Guattari contends that machines are essentially constituted by a 'desire for abolition' so that 'its emergence is doubled with breakdown, catastrophe—the menace of death' (Guattari, 1995, 37). It is exactly according to this view, perhaps, that he loved very much artistic machines or works by Jean Tinguely. Whereas, Ishimure's writings on the everyday life of Japan in Minamata, by keeping a patient distance from modern or industrial technologies, tend to listen to un-avowable voices of Nature where human beings were also involved. At least, she was presentient of permanent or tantalizing catastrophe of the singular event (that were realized in pollution and diseases and been constantly experienced after the 3.11).

Secondly, according SR or OOO, in this lineage of thoughts, it is argued that one cannot have a direct accesses to objects. The real being of objects is always hidden or withdrawn from human cognition. Real objects exist as outside the correlation between subjects and objects, thinking and being, us and the world. There is always the *world without us*. Objects and things consist in themselves as beside human cognition and their accesses. In this theory, objects don't relate to each other, but they have the allure and the power to seduce each other in the mode of a contact without touching, or a *contact within distance*. Objects give each other certain notes of their sensual aspects, while other objects including humans can exclusively receive their sensual caricatures. In other words, all objects have inaccessible zones or dark parts within them. (Harman, 2018)

When one uses tools as objects, it operates transparently for us (humans). It means that we don't know the relational articulation wherein each tool or object is located in a meaningful whole, that is shaped as the articulated semantic structure. One utilizes them without any specific concern or involvement. In this way, some constitutive ignorance is always imposed on us; thus, humans cannot directly access objects. However, as Graham Harman has succinctly delineated, when tools or objects are broken or caught in malfunction, one can unexpectedly encounter a certain singular-reality of objects and things, and also envision the very articulated relation woven among themselves. (Harman, 2018) In other words, broken tools and in-operated objects could suggest a vestige of the real dark core of tools and objects.

In the light of interpretation above, the following paragraph written by Ishimure is worth reading; I quoted it here at length.

‘In the summer, Hiroko’s father doesn’t make floats. Carrying a small basket, he goes down to the beach every day to gather sea snails and other edible mollusks. Summer after summer I watched him walk along the beach in the typical swaying, in the coordinated way of Minamata Disease patients. His feet would invariably get caught in the green laver washed ashore by the waves, or else he would stumble over slippery rocks, fall and hurt himself. Whenever he lost his foothold, he would tear his clothes on the sharp edges of the rocks or on dry branches. Unaware of his tattered clothes fluttering about him like seaweed, he wandered aimlessly under the glaring sunlight. He seemed to have emerged from the dazzling silver path stretching across the sea, or from a distant, yet familiar underworld. If I was close enough for him to spot me, his face would light up in a childlike smile. As he walked slowly away, he would look back every hundred meters or so, flashing his unbearably innocent smile’. (Ishimure, 1990, 312)

In the contemporary Japan, ordinary people are not familiar with the fishing float called *Aba*. No one usually knows the meaningful location within the articulated relation for its specific purpose or usage. Despite this condition, or even precisely because of it, this unknown fishing tool can suggest the presence of not only the relational setting in which each tool or object can be located properly, but also of Nature as an unknown assemblages or mesh-work of things, animate or inanimate beings. The fishing float *Aba*, as Ishimure had mentioned, is not a broken tool in Heideggerian sense. Paradoxically, *Aba*, as a non-utilized and unknown tool in the contemporary daily life of Japan, can afford us the vision and vibes of silent beings immanent within Nature.

The withdrawn dimension of objects retains their dark core or secret kernel, that Graham Harman succinctly called *dormant parts* of objects in their depths. (Harman, 2010, 71) In other words, every object has a sleeping part of its own inside as a kind of constitutive outside. Technological objects within the mechano- or techno-spheres also keep the dark nuclei in themselves. This part of dormancy of objects doesn’t imply the presence of the essence receded within things and objects. As far as objects are withdrawn despite deploying their dark parts in a sensual actualization, they are unrecognizable to human cognition. Simply speaking, humans cannot reach things and objects, but rather things and objects, including machines, animals and plants, all sentient beings are regarding humans. Just as we are regarding objects, *they are seeing us and they think about us*. (Much before OOO or SR, in the thought of his late period, Baudrillard had subtly presented this kind of argument. (Baudrillard, 2001, 21, 31, 2005, 31)

Let me illustrate it with another example. Sashimi are not just slices of raw fish. We can cut fish into pieces but they couldn’t be called sashimi if they were not professionally prepared. The raw materials of sea foods, cut with sophistication, are so comfortable to our tongues; there is some kind of sensual reality or taste that freshly cut meats of fishes provide; but if they were cut by amateurs without specific techniques, their message could not come across. It is not about the division between essence and appearance, nature and manifestation. Nevertheless, there is no scheme that consist between the opposition of essence and its alienation. Cooking is not creation *ex nihilo* but rather it is the unexpected encountering with the different kinds of appearance

or manifestations of hidden parts that one could unfold by manipulating objects as resources or materials. In cooking, things are playfully elaborated and accentuated as the gap or scission between essence and appearance. As living beings, sashimi is already broken but on tongue; there is a performative moment that we can encounter hidden objects within eatable materials. In this sense, it is not coincidence that Ishimure wrote about cooking a lot in her writings. She addressed spirits and divine beings in food materials from mountains or seaside areas. The title of her book of cooking is interesting in this sense: *Cooking and Mimicking Houseworks* 食べごしらえ、おままごと (Ishimure, 2012). Ishimure definitely recognized mimicry in the root of cooking and was aware of a significance of contact in frictions with things, materials and non-human agencies.

The intentionality cannot only be located in humans side, which is not a unique human capacity at all. Even though it sounds crazy, objects can be grasped and recognized precisely because they constitute a very unified reality which is not exhausted by any articulated relation (mainly linguistic one) from the outside. Objective affection and human intentionality are always asymmetrical in a certain non-relation. The real human can only meet a phenomenal or sensual tree, while the real tree exclusively concerns itself with a mere caricature or magic realism of us, humans.

Ishimure clearly proclaimed her posture toward animism in the everyday life. In her small essay titled ‘The way passing back and fourth’ (往還道), for instance, she addressed ‘tangent potato candy’ (からいも飴). When kids in Minamata dropped them by mistake, they cease to belong to them (humans); ownership would be transferred to the ants, worms and all different insects, that (who) used to be called ‘those people’ (あのひとたち). The habit of calling non-human living beings ‘those people’ has been frequently observed in many rural parts in Japan. The candy caught by ants or worms are conveyed like ‘portable shrine’ (御神輿) in Japanese local festivals. This is already far from and beyond a mere anthropomorphism. Instead, it is even envisioned as a kind of literary tactic implying the part of communication in which human and non-human beings, all things and objects, are living symbiotically, not always necessarily in a comfortable or harmonic manner. Most adult persons in the daily life after the modernization of Japan, even when they agreed with this cosmology in their taste, are excluded from such a symbiotic communication in their daily consciousness. This short essay was written and published before the emergence of the catastrophe known as Minamata Disease. Despite the celebratory happy days, we cannot only enjoy its beauty, but also interpret that Ishimure’s animistic cosmology (or even cosmo-politics) and some contemporary continental philosophy can be tuned conceptually with each other, when one will try to survive in the everyday life by negotiating with the technology and capital driven by hyper-objective weird forces and symptoms. Then, irresponsible corporative firms such as Chisso (or Tepco in the recent context after the Fukushima nuclear disasters), the illogical nation state such as Japan, all of us and all things or debris after the incidence could be envisioned through the perspective of an uncanny symbiosis or antagonistic conviviality.

Of course, one can say the metaphorical personal nomination she utilized is just an anthropomorphism, that is the humanization of non-humans or the projection of humanity into other

existences. As for animism, one can recognize or identify the presence of souls, spirits and anima in general within everything including non-human beings. But her expression cannot be reduced to animism. Then how about vitalism? In everything including non-human beings, one can suppose a vital force and energy within all existences whatever might be living or non-living, which is also defined as a *throbbing vibrant momentum* just as some philosophers have explained so. (Jane Bennet, 2010) But obviously Ishimure didn't presuppose such a presence of vital forces in everything existing in this living world. In the end, we are subsequently led to the notion of panpsychism in this context. In both cognitive science and contemporary philosophy, panpsychism has been somehow envisioned as a kind of buzzword since years. This notion is helpful to analyze this piece.

What is panpsychism? Why has this notion been invoked and invented? The debates are proceeding around in both cognitive sciences and continental (speculative) philosophy. According to both biologists and cognitive scientists, slime molds can find the shortest way in the maze (as a sort of knowledge), and fishes have responses of anxiety or horror (as a sort of affections), and crayfishes can make decision making (as a sort of will). But rather than raising the notion of panpsychism as the method or perspective to interpret some aspects of Ishimure's works, here I would like to make a remark that there is a certain unconscious current or conceptual platform in which the desire of focusing on non-human agencies is operative. It is not about just a specific way of representation of delineating or expressing non-humans as human shapes. 'A heap of stones is not a machine, whereas a wall is already a static proto-machine....' (Guattari, 1995, 42). But, of course, stones neither have intelligence nor sentience but they can become machines or proto-subjectivity potentially. It is clear that Guattari was not thinking of panpsychism but his ecosophy could be considered its precursor.

From another angle, comparative psychologist and ethologist, Moriyama Toru contends that the velocity of mutually grinding stones is modulated by stones themselves. When stones are grinding each other, the surface of stones is slowly peeled off. The moment of separation between molecular particles of peeling stones and fixed stones is determined from both sides. Stones can modulate the timing and speeds. In this case, relatively fixed stones emerge and present a still state before moving or grinding, where stones holds the quasi-mind which is a 'hidden or withdrawn agency'. Good lithic artisans consider that they don't make cracks of stones but instead stones are decomposed independently or spontaneously as if they had motivation and wills. Artisans cannot control or modulate vibrations and throbbing momentum but rather various vibes are autonomously emerging from stones themselves. The capacity of being beaten and cracked up is hidden and withdrawn within themselves. The example Moriyama has raised is quite intriguing. When the mug can be utilized as a hammer for needles of stapler on the table, the mug can determinate by itself to what extent it can vibrate. The human observers are not aware of it, while the hidden agency or withdrawn momentum within objects is to be called a 'mind'. (Moriyama, 2017) The mind is defined as something immanent within objects, which humans cannot recognize and approach from its outside.

Through the light of his research, it is possible to see that Ishimure's vision cannot be reduced to the traditional or conventional type of animism. It seems to me it is more conceptually close to panpsychism which has recently been discussed a lot in the scene of contemporary

thought. Panpsychism doesn't contend that all existences including non-human or non-living beings hold the intelligence, psyche and anima, but rather suggests us the possibility of a different kind of sentience from human intelligence or cognitive capacity. Unlike a metaphorical anthropomorphism or cozy animism, panpsychism problematizes the relation of thinking and being, subjectivities and the world, mind and Nature. In other words, the perspective of panpsychism allows us to think about the question of what is really a psyche, an anima and a sentience respectively. The effect as such emerged between real objects and sensual objects, according to the explanation by Graham Harman, can be already envisioned as a certain sentience or "psyche". If we take the Guattarian conceptual framework, the dark agency within objects as nuclei of a potential deployment toward the 'incorporeal universes of values', it assumes a *chaosmic* (a rapid interaction between chaos and cosmos through osmosis) dynamics woven between fusions and scission as the disjunction of the world. Obviously, this understanding of a chaosmic vibrant interaction is to be connected to the idea of chaosmosis raised by Guattari.

The Mind is not one and unique. It permeates everywhere; it is omnipresent. Both non human things hold a secret and in-exhaustive privacy segmented from others. But it extends infinitely or universally; it operates transversally. This view doesn't intend to claim that all things have the mind, cognition, spirit, emotion and sensibility, but tend to understand that something similar operation to human mind or sentience can be confirmed in the broader horizon than one used to presuppose so. In this sense, we can agree with Harman's modest option as the term poly-psychism, not necessarily panpsychism. (Harman, 2010, 206-207)

Rather than trying to represent the voice of the oppressed people from the position of intellectuals or writers, Ishimure's writings attempt to just listen to the silent voices of, and to tune themselves into the vibes of, Nature as machinic assemblages or more simply, Nature as the *other*. In such a case, the concept of ambience (milieu) can help us see the connection—to question ecosophy, with its concern for environmental, social, and mind spheres and their relations to each other. This leads us to an elaboration of the notion of "subjectivity as ambience" (or proto-objectivity as an ambience).

All beings have both insides and outsides, or privacy and (public) appearance, or the first-person experience and the third person character. Romanticism admires Nature while it subsumes and incorporates own surroundings and landscapes, where the self is merged with its background. In this case, the ego as the romantic self is extended to its surrounding environment as a whole: Nature in the perspective of literary or philosophical romanticism. The narrative by Ishimure, through the ecocritical perspective, locates Nature as the other, which is defined as non-human agency on the one hand, while Ishimure's cosmological and ecocritical discourse locates the *self as the third person* although it might sound strange. Or even, the self is identified with/as objects or things belonging to non-human lineage in a certain context: the everyday condition and situation in Minamata since the 1960s or after the events of the 3.11.

'Up to the time of my first visit to the hospital, I'd been an inconspicuous, self-effacing housewife; impractical, inclined to spend my time in useless reveries. I had a preference for old songs and ballads, and occasionally dabbled in poetry. I was, of course, incurably in love with the calm expanse of the Shiranui Sea and with the smooth, end-



less tideland it exposed when it ebbed into the distance. Judging by the average life expectancy of Kyushu women, it seemed to me that I could live to be over 70 years old.’ (Ishimure, 1990,139).

After having written so, Ishimure proclaims her fatal feeling of shamefulness in being (as) human. ‘On the day I saw Tsurumatsu, above all else, I despised myself unbearably for being part of the despicable human race.’ (ibid, 139) Precisely, here it is possible to articulate her *humanism via non-humanism*. (Tsurumatsu was a patient of Minamata Disease.)

Ishimure’s texts suggest that the mind and subjectivity of humans are also one of objects or things, which are even strange, weird and uncanny ones. The regards, voices and effects of her texts are emerged as radically different from those under the framework of “humanism” which usually see objects and things exclusively in the correlations of the world and humans. Put it differently, her texts afford us effects which are ascribed to human but also irreducible to human ones at the same time. Objects do not only have the allure and affect each other, but even in a differential modes of objects, sensual objects and real objects, affect each other by allusions via sensual notes and certain caricatures of the latter. Or we are almost tempted to utilize the term clone for such a speculative caricaturization.

The affection in Spinozian sense (as a capacity of being affecting/affected) might not be restricted to a privileged capacity of humans, but can potentially be seen in all living or non-living beings in the world. Even inanimate objects and non-living entities are provided with a potentiality toward sentience and quasi-intelligence in the form of affections or prehension within the universe of things. If post-structuralism and postmodernism so far have been concerned with, and dependent on, the notion of intersubjectivity, then the contemporary speculative philosophy or speculative (philo-)fiction is instead focused on that of *inter-objectivity*. The same holds true for Ishimure’s writings. Her style opted in *Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow* cannot be simply called an oral history, a reportage or a documentary on the corporative or public pollutions and their fatal results. The texts of this series often addresses the very details of things, tools, plants, fishes, shells, birds, animals and so on.

In another book, Ishimure says,

‘Even if one weaves human languages in multiple folds, the first recognition that these communications are just merely available among humans comes into reality. Human languages cannot reach to plants or trees and animals. Just as there are myriad ways of maturing when beans of figs fall down to the ground, we humans are born alone in an isolation and singularity, or just can cry and dance at the moment of being as an adult person, by keeping vibes with the undifferentiated and indistinct (non-verbal and living) world in the dark depth.’ (Ishimure, 2013, by my own tentative translation)

Certainly, as Harman had clarified so, objects don’t relate but make allusions to each other. Allure is a form of fusion or mutual inclusion (as a moment of chaosmosis between machines, livings and things), but it does not yet establish any relational structure in general. Both unity and plurality of things are always dismantled or cracked in the modern world. The effect of dis-

mantling and transmutation in Ishimure's essays against pollutions has been freeing objects from their conventional value of universes. Put it differently, the incipient moment of aesthetics, ethics and ecosophy (ecology+philosophy) is neither subject nor object, but rather assemblages or unnatural participations in which the subject is not necessarily human, nor does the object need not be mere inanimate. The dark agency within objects as nuclei of a potential deployment toward incorporeal universes assumes a chaotic dynamics woven between fusions and scission as the disjunction of the world.

As a tentative conclusion, I am tempted to hold a reverie of materializing and articulating animism (or immaterialism) in the thought of a coming planetary (un-) thinking. In order to engage with this attempt, at first, we should accept and embrace texts that have been so far read in the humanistic context, as a specific type of objects and things. We, human subjectivity, can think and feel; but things, objects, non-human beings can do so as well. Both exist in the same flat horizon but acts differently and separately.

At least, with the help of allusions of non-human sides that Ishimure has repeatedly suggested, we could listen the resonant vibes of Nature and environment in terms of anti-development or non-acceleration of techno-industrialization. Her discourse is concerned not only with an ecology about the symbiosis between humans and other species but also with the ecology of generic *degrowth* in the sense that Laruelle had deployed in his recent writings. Certainly our civilization has been deeply dependent upon the progression and acceleration of using energy and technology since the beginning of the modernity. However, if the philosophy of degrowth can be elaborated, it is not necessary equated with a thought of the so-called slow life or philosophy of low development, because it draws not on finitude of human but finitude of immanence of Nature. On this conceptual platform where Ishimure's texts and recent currents of philosophy are transversally assembled, I believe, the challenging question will be set for the next section: how to elaborate the thinking on "deceleration" —no longer acceleration, and the degrowth of philosophy. (Laruelle, 2012, 328)

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