**The Ontology of Withdrawal (2):**
*What is the Void? And Other Respects*

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**Abstract**

This essay continues to provide with an introductory explanation of some basic conceptions raised by French philosopher Francois Laruelle, of which the previous section of this series of essay has already scrutinized, while keeping in mind something comparable or counterparts within some Japanese philosophy including Izutsu Toshihiko’s one or other potential references. Insofar as Laruelle’s non-philosophy has given conceptual inspirations for the recent debates around speculative philosophy and Object-Oriented Ontology since a decade, in which I am interested in the intention of re-elaborating the potentiality of (speculative) materialism in both the philosophical sense and critical theory.

(1) **Man-in-Man or Man-in-person**

Man as the concept in Laruelle’s sense is not to be categorized in Heideggerian everyman, ‘Das Man’, which is an alienated or degraded mode deprived of existential singularity. It sinks into a depth of routined everyday life and mass level of conformity, and consequently lacks the will capable of making decision starkly. The concept of Man in Laruelle doesn’t simply indicate the species being of humanity. It is not a universal concept covering all human beings. Laruelle wishes to grasp individuals and humans as the singular being with its own generic being. Unlike young Marx’s humanism, here, the notion of generic is not ascribed to the essence of human. In the same vein, history must be treated as both generic and singular as well. Just as one cannot treat history as such, intellectuals cannot deal with history, even though it is the cause of them. The very impossibility of determining history is generally defined as “Man-in-person” or “Name-of-Man”, in Laruelle’s non-philosophy, which is later articulated with “Victim-in-person” as the absent cause of history. Of course, this terminology in Laruelle, as it simply addresses exclusively male, is problematic in terms of gender, sexuality and feminism. But if we would attempt to use Woman-in-person, it doesn’t make sense so much.

Man-in-person is also defined as subjects without predicates, or individuals without qualities and properties. This conception can be traced back to his earlier work entitled *A Biography of Ordinary Man* (1985). Thus before elaborating the notion of Man-in-Man, or Man-in-person,
Laruelle has already raised another concept of the ‘ordinary man’ in the mid of 1980’s, which was not simply ascribed to everyman or common people in the convention of sociology or critical theory. Laruelle’s ordinary man doesn’t indicate humble everyman, but retains some singularity in its conception. Usually the so-called ordinary man with an inalienable essence is starkly contrasted with the series of articulated structure of Being, the State, desires and Language. (BO,7) The Man-in-man is not reducible to a mere sum of its attributes of being, living, speaking, acting, expressing, documenting, thinking and philosophizing. It is primarily an actual man through the potential development in its own right, but not real man nor man-in-the Real, since nobody can reach to the very reality or existence of its own respective agencies. The real man must be a subject, or nothing but subjectivities tuned with objects and their finitude. (BO,8)

The One keeps partially the essence of man, which is built within a propriety on which it could not project by itself: a nothing-but-subject or an absolute-as-subject. It exists as a finitude which will retroactively be identified in any kind of philosophy. All individuals are always just real anterior to any kind of presupposition of a totality or whole. Ordinary man, by definition, is devoid of any attributions, characters, qualities and predicates in a positive sense. (BO, 9) He doesn’t feel himself to be settled comfortably in-the-world. Ordinary man simply enjoys of being tuned with a solitude in withdrawing from society, history, ethos and conventions, etc. But he is not secured in a status of the cartesian cogito. Insofar as he engages with thinking non-philosophically, what is at stake is no longer the problematics of Being, but the One out-of-decision. In this context, the One is not Unity nor Unitary Ideal which the convention of philosophy prefers to hold. Duality sustains each moment as dual: The One and the world, individuals and History, Language and the State, minors and majors, minorities and Authorities. (ibid) Ordinary man can resist and rebel against historical, cultural, linguistic, sexual formations of identity and the duality as their result. It simply would like to exit out of any determination of being so that it can encounter an ontological struggle, for instance, in the political, cultural and environmental issues. Just as the non-philosophy would like to problematize all presumed decision which determines any philosophical decision, ‘science is an other or even the Other of the philosophical Decision’ (TI,37) Non-philosophy inclines to lead to science in the essential level.

According to Laruelle, science supposes and believes to handle a real object, which departs from its cause, that is, the One as an object as One-in-the-last-instance. (TI,39) In other words, the One is a singular object that is immanent to the objective sphere without embracing or circumscribing all other objects. The One is neither an object among objects nor an object counted as unity subsuming other objects into itself. The One is thoroughly the object which cannot be an element of a larger mode than sum of parts of objects. It is always called ‘the One as nothing-but-individual’. (TI,49) Objects of/in both science and non-philosophy are always determined as One-in-the-last-instance. But why has Laruelle been sticking to the concept of the determination-in-the-last-instance raised by French marxist, Louis Althusser since long time? Is Laruelle still Marxist? Maybe no, yet his position still remains a kind of radical dissident or political rebel in his project of non-philosophy. The “last instance” demands a strict respect for the uni-laterality of these relations and, above all, of these non-relations. (BO,34) The term of the last instance in Laruelle doesn’t mean exclusively the capacity of ultimate determination of economy or infrastructure in the Marxist sense.

It is still obscure but his motivation is clear: Both being and thinking, the subject and the
world, are always unilaterally determined by something in the ultimate level. In his case, it is ascribed not only to economy in the limited sense, but also the conjunction in general within each sphere of ethic, ontology and ecology as well. Laruelle rejects any attempt of defining this “something” as the God or transcendental existence, but rather the very last instance enables them the result of overdetermination by building itself within certain discursive formations. The limited economy (the economy in a conventional or restricted sense) is just one of such formations along with ecology, ethnology, ethic and the general economy.

Then the One has to be conceptually invoked here. It is the One that prevents the unilaterality from fading into the unconscious layers of human cognition and affords its reality by inverting its significance. (BO,46) The One is always immanent to itself, but it requires no withdrawal to recede into itself. The One simply exists as a withdrawal while its very appearance manifests itself as a retreat, despite it sounds paradoxically. But it occurs within a withdrawal of things and objects from phenomena into the real, not only lived through the human existence or cognitive agency. This retreat is detached from any relation, but rather the One makes itself its unilateral determination of non-relation or pure irreversibility which enables and actualizes the relation in general. Unilaterality is the very reality of its own inadequacy within/from any identification. (TI,134) In the same vein, Laruelle suggests that the philosopher thinks circularly, while ordinary man thinks irreversibly.(BO,109)

The One for Laruelle, however, is not exclusively involved with philosophy but with science as such. This terminology of science seems to be inspired by Althusser again. Even Deleuze and Guattari, in the note for the conclusion of their What is Philosophy? raised the question about the relationship between non-philosophy and (non-)science. (Delueze&Guattari, 1991, 234) The theory of science, for Laruelle, is a realism in-the-last-instance unlike transcendental theory and philosophy on cognitions and perceptions. Science through the One thinks and envisions the Real all at once, where the One is graspable with envisioning multiplicities as a whole or unity. That is the reason why Laruelle has also invented the notion of the ‘Vision-in-One’ in his system. The One can deploy itself as its own multiplication. Science in this sense is minimized or undermined as the very experience of the real, which has not yet been articulated or envisioned with (semantic or linguistic) structures, but always already situated in-the-last-instance.

(2) Victim

We have already confirmed in the previous section that the subject can become the stranger as such in the system of Laruelle’s non-philosophy: the subject-stranger. It is quite a different position from the theory of alienation which was provided with Marx’s early work of political economy and philosophy in the 1844, since there is no longer a lament of the deficiency or alienation of human essence as the generic species. Surprisingly Laruelle even proclaims the possibility to call the subject-stranger, “proletariat”. For him the stranger is invoked as the most generic identity of human. But how can this definition be justified? In this context, we should examine the role of the concept of the Other in Laruelle’s thought. ‘The Other is the way in which the One admits the existence of the World and of the non(-One)’. (BO,218)

In another perspective, the One is the finitude by living and deploying itself as a finite subject. The One seems to participate and penetrate into everything in the world. But the One is not
an omnipresent entity and then doesn’t circumscribe the world or Nature as a whole or unity. The One in Laruelle never holds the omnipotency or effects of totalization. But there is no psychoanalytical nuance in the insufficiency or lack. Because finite drive is devoid of negativity or nihilation for nothingness (BO, 199), so it means, unlike Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalytical theory, that being finite is not the condition of the reality of drive. (BO, 154, 201)

In Laruelle’s non philosophy, there are both the subject-stranger and the kind of victim. Now the latter notion is to be clarified. Although Laruelle utilizes the terms such as victim, sacrifice, God, gnostic and mystic, etc, it is somehow incredible to see that his arguments has not necessarily addressed, and been inspired by, the theory of the sacred in general. In other words, the notion of victim by Laruelle has nothing to do with the concept of the sacred. The sacred for him is not restricted to the context of sociology, but instead it retains fruitful conceptual resources that has also inspired the various philosophy and critical theory. Seemingly his system doesn’t need the series of concepts deployed by M. Mauss, G. Bataille, G. Agamben, etc. Usually the “sacrifice” of God is the condition for messianity or the christian node to be able to constitute itself and to be valid by itself. The God or victim as a mediator is always sublated and invoked for the stable establishment of the symbolic or religious order, which involves with a political order as well.

Laruelle insists that his non-philosophy tends to be both scientific and heretic or mystic at the same time. Although it sounds quite irrational and paradoxical, if we follow his logic of the general theory of victims in details, then some different perspective can be presented. This science as non-philosophy can or must contain the logic of victim, which nevertheless is no longer deployed in the form of Christianity, Judaism, dialectic, trilogy, theology and the scapegoat theory, even though there are a bunch of tropes from Judeo-Christian and victim theory in Laruelle’s discourse. Generally, in the victim theory, the position of the sacrificed is presented, represented and (over-)exposed especially. Laruelle makes a distinction of two types of victimhood between ‘overexposed’ (or ‘over-represented’) victim and ‘superposed’ victim. (GV, 28) As for the former, it is easy for us to recall all spectacular or images of suffered, minorities and victims propagated via the net and mass media in our everyday life. But according to Laruelle the latter is more concerned with science. The notion of ‘superposition’ as a scientific model is drawn from quantum physics. Philosophy is a quasi-physics,…….with ‘conceptual particles’ created by or as ‘vibration, diffractions, superpositions, interferences’. (LAN, 158) The point for him is about a passage or even superposition ‘from the victim-image to the Victim-in-person or lived victim’, which the intellectual in his/her person should clone or revive rather than repeat or represent. (ibid) The generic intellectual can be authorized exclusively by the Victim-in-person. (GV, 121) In the other way, he also summarizes that ‘superposition is a sacrifice……but sacrifice as unilateral suspension of reciprocal mediation…….’ (CF, 219) Put differently, his usage of the term superposition allows us to understand one of the reasons why Laruelle has always emphasized the significance of conceptions of quantum physics for elaborating his system of non-philosophy, which might also come from his preference to admit some crucial moment of determinations within the world.

Then, what is the superposition in his non-philosophy? In order to respond to the question, it is crucial to think and analyze the notion of victim. Originally, Laruelle induces the concept of victim and even forges his own of Victim-in-person through a certain tour de force. But it is still closely related to both notions of ‘Man-in-person’ or ‘Name-of-Man’ which derives from
his early conception of the ordinary man. Humans or intellectuals cannot necessarily reach their very history. The impossible encountered in history is called Victim-in-person. Again it is also called the “absent cause” which also seems to have an echo with Althusserian marxism. (IP, 11) The Victim-in-person is not simply the name of suffered population or individuals, but rather is defined as the generic human in the understanding from Laruelle’s non-philosophy, insofar as it holds a potentiality of being and even becoming rebel against oppressors, by which it intends to transfigure an object or singular event of the living world. It is the existential mode capable of rising up and bringing about an insurrection. The Victim-in-person cannot be represented, salvaged and rescued. Its position can no longer be negotiable or contestable, nevertheless never be shaped as a taboo or untouchable. But at the same time, it is located at a point of radical indecision or the Undecided. (IP, 63) In other words, the Victim-in-person cannot be equated with the position of marginal or ambiguity where a person or individual is trapped in the point of indecision. So what is a stake is not to look for the suffered or repressed as a marginal victim somewhere in a given society, but to recognize that we all are potentially victims or, at least, hostages and just minorities. In his word, it is stated simply that ‘we are minorities, they are us, they are not other’s, that is a position which invert or rather unilateralize the World and the State. (BO, 40) But it neither means that all minorities and us are same, identical and equal, nor we share something with minority. But rather when one, especially as the determined intellectual, enters the particularly troublesome issues with the state, history, languages, one should begin to address or criticize the state by thinking and “performing” the condition of victim.

‘Man is not a victimizable being, he is only such as subject, but he alone can determine an intellectual for the relation of the Victim and history. This Victim is not a represented victim, so it is not her sensible representation or her ideal representation, a Victim in herself as certain philosophers would dream of her’. (IP, 64) From another angle, it can be said that Victim is not identified simply with any messiah or charisma, but intellectuals are eager to, and interested in, becoming and serving to Victim. But it is not an object for a mere sympathy. Instead, a compassion for Laruelle is quite different from a mere pity or empathy in the humanistic sense. (GV, 134) Victim can navigate intellectuals, although intellectuals try to imitate the position of messiah in a certain context, not exactly the state of victim. Intellectuals thus can be called the clones of victim. Not represented but superposed, the clone as victim (also as the victim as clone) is reviving in-act and in-form infinitely. The notion of cloning is adopted by Laruelle in order to avoid the framework of rivalry mimetic antagonism, which has frequently been combined with theory of sacrifice in humanities. Cloning, in his non-philosophy inspired by contemporary techno-sciences, is not dependent on imitation or mimesis at all. Indeed, clones are simply the strangers among ourselves. (CF, 239) Intellectuals attempt to emulate and clone victims through their capacity of being and becoming a subject-stranger. That is one of crucial points of Laruelle’s non-philosophical system.

Victims, however, are not actualized or empowered by intellectuals, but rather the very generic intellectuals exclusively allow victims to articulate their positions in infinite fractal manners. Compassion arisen within intellectuals always requires some weakness. Without a certain awareness of weak moment in oneself, it is impossible to assume or compare some weakness with other’s positions and its marginality. One might be inclined to link this weakness to the “so-
called weak thought” by Vattimo, as one of threads within postmodern thoughts, which eschews to construct any vertical or consolidated axis of logocentric hierarchy. Weakness and un-power are kernels of insurrectional or rebel act. In other words, both radical poles of active and passive in a compassion are superposed through the minimal insurrection or resistance in the everyday life. Laruelle even thinks that a radical activity can derive from a pure non-acting or radical passivity (or pathic) which is always the ‘prior-to-the-first insurrection’ or lies in affects as determined in-the-last-instance. (GV, 81, 134-135, 142) It is also suggested that an act generally can arise from non-acting or inoperative works. Through this procedure, a compassion lived through the immanence of the Victim-in-person permits us to become the subject-stranger through the non-relational position of generic intellectual as the clone of victim. There is no more the figuration of intellectuals as hero of sympathizing with, or representing, the victimized and suffered population.

(3) Chaos and fractals

‘We will have to understand the One as One-Multiple and the One-Multiple as chaos’. (TI, 47) The One is not simply the source of emanation developed into the multiple, but instead the One is an index of multiplicities. Or it can be stated that the multiple is the existential mode of the One, while the One is an index of multiplicities. It is not a mere rhetoric but an ontological perspective. Each object contains, at least, two overlapped sites in the real as well as in the sensory along with a mutual disjunction between de-similarity and partial identity, visible side and invisible side of it.

Laruelle discussed the concepts of chaos and fractality a lot in his early 1990’s work entitled Theory of Identities. From this title and its era, one might readily expect the argument over the “so-called identity politics” or the theory of political identity. But this work primarily has nothing to do with these debates. In the almost same period of the time (in the early 1990’s) when Felix Guattari discussed both notions of chaos and complexity by inventing his own concept of chaosmosis, Laruelle was also deploying his conceptions around chaos in that book. It seems that for Laruelle, the fractal is the very reality of objects and things. ‘The fractal is itself the order: chaos has its essence——but in-the-last-instance alone——in the most primitive order’. (TI, 174) Chaos is not simply a mess or disorder. It holds its own texture or grain of a certain order. ‘Chaos is not confusion’. (TI, 180) This point is also confirmed in Guattari’s last work Chaosmosis, although their conceptual intentions are different each other in many regards. Because Laruelle doesn’t see an operation of chaos or chaosmos in the esthetics in both technological and living (incorporeal) world which, in the case of Guattari, is set in a diagrammatic quadruple of flow, machinic phylum, existential territory and incorporeal universes in order to develop a pragmatics of tactical alternatives in politics, cultures, economy and ecology (ecosophy).

In Laruelle’s non-philosophy, chaos is always thought along with fractals or fractality in the mathematical view. Chaos is equated with the ‘generalized fractality’ in his Theory of Identities. (TI, 119) The fractality, in the explication by the mathematician, Benoit Mandelbrot, is a certain order of reality that assumes respective autonomy in some extent. But it is not necessarily given fully in Nature as such. Nature consists and deploys itself in detailed and differentiated
fragmentations of its infinite immanent forms and entangled assemblages. In other words, Nature always holds its own lack and void in a sense. In fact, the theory of science is a realism in-the-last-instance, which might not be science as such but concerns with representations and transcendence in human cognitions. Rather it is deployed in various modes of differential existences with irregular forms in the living environment or vital milieu, which is presented and expressed exclusively through the process of fractals.

Let me take an example of complicated shapes of some coasts, of some movements of clouds and drift works of oceans. There are myriads of perspectives for a given object in each different scales of observation or grades of visual resolutions. Each view in varied scales of measuring, objects (shapes of coasts, clouds and oceans, etc) can be envisioned differently. Nevertheless, objects remains the same as the real. Or the very reality of objects is not identified as a unique entity, but rather the reality of objects manifests itself in many ways. Each time, in fragmentary changes or partial figurations, objects present themselves in almost infinite multiplications. It is no longer possible to grasp an object in the one and only condition. Fractality allows us to face up the difficulty and impossibility to access objects directly, but suggests the fact that there is always some remainders in our access to the reality of objects. In other words, objects always retain a certain kind of excessive within themselves, which is also defined as dormant parts of every objects. (Harman, 2010) General fractality can be defined as one of moments of the hidden reality of objects which is always determined unilaterally.

Generally the scientific discourses are always dependent on curves, angles and points on the one hand, while philosophy is developed in the movement and flow of smoothing out through a potential of ‘reserve’ on the other hand. Philosophy always presupposes the partial layer of reserve as a potential field in which the virtual is ready for the contingent actualization, while science cannot follow and hold it. (TI,113,180) Then how is the case about non-philosophy? Seemingly Laruelle also assumes the latent presence of reserve even in his project of non-philosophy. In his non-philosophical notion of chaos, even slight local curves or changes can enact fractal events and fatally irreversible catastrophes. Fractality is one of extreme cases in varied differential scales of objects and things in the living world. Fractality as the last-instance-of Identity in Laruelle’s non-philosophy is to be accounted of both objects and its representation, of being and thinking, of things and knowledge of it. This reserve is also closely tied up with the chora, which is the manifestation of the hidden. (TI,117) The absolute donation and giveness of the withdrawal is not necessarily opposed to parousia as the counterpart of the hidden.

(4) Void

The Multiple must be gained within the system through transcendence. (TI,47) The One is also an effect of a fissure, a rift, a cut and a scission of oppositions. Put differently, the One embraces and retains its immanent outside or constitutive exteriority within itself, which is to be called the void.

The void is not nothing (ness). It is especially different from the religious or mystical sense of nothingness. In Izutsu’s philosophical system inspired by both Islam as I have already remarked it in the previous section, however, the notion of nothingness was sometimes endowed with the infinite or omnipresent power of creation and preservation of the living world as
such. (Izutsu, 2008) ‘What is this “nothing (of-the-political)” that appears to define essence’? (BO,29)

In this context, some efficacy of the ontology of the void must be examined in several attempts in the recent political theory (Lefort, Badiou, Laclau and Laruelle). It is not a mere empty place of a power or authority which can be filled in. What might be counted as void or nothing is disseminated through a situation included in the rare or singular event. In Badiou’s political philosophy, the void cannot be given any content. The empty set doesn’t have its element besides itself. The rudimental parts of the void is embedded in a site of (political or social) situation. In Laruelle’s theory, however, the void can be named but not counted, for it points out the absent fullness of the situation. Democracy, emancipation, equality……as the universal value is inserted in the each specific site and situation as the particular and local value and manifestation. There is a mutual contamination or participation of both universal and particular, which no longer operates in dialectics. It happens, in Laruelle’s non-philosophy, as the quantum superposition of the One-in-One and the multiple. (AB,62) Non-philosophy supposes a philosophy of the void which presents ‘the limit of the void as Being without object or reality’. (AB,79) The void cannot be equated with Being, but the One-in-the-last instance radicalizes the void of Being through a radical immanence and immanent superposition. (AB,118) In order to think mutual inclusions of wave/particle models or Marxism and quantum theory, Laruelle dares to call the void a collider in which different moments are scattered.

The void cannot be understood by uncovering the veil for the truth, such as the case of Heideggerian sense of aletheia, and subsequently being unable to enter the correlation between thinking and being, or subjectivities and what they recognize with a previously grasped or constructed reality. In this sense, the void is not merely the unaccessible and unthinkable, which is actually graspable only through what is put beyond any comprehension and articulations. Then the void might be envisioned as the effect of fear, anxiety, dread and uneasiness, although it holds seductive force to attract human subjectivities. The idea of void is often summoned up with the occasion in which there is no exit less than yielding to uncanny or strange forces. But the void here is supposed to be capable of combining the world for us and the world without us (Peak D, 2014), or in other words, it operates to follow and dig out a gap between the conventional or common sociality and the alter-native or self-deviant sociality. The ontological void is a certain catapult on which some bullets of potentials toward a vacuum space or endless passage is launched. Then the subjects as human agency are driven and mobilized by a strange, uncanny and unknown attractor, and always pass through this void. Objective reality is drawn and extracted by the One and reduced or foreclosed to its actual shape, which is a void within philosophical formalizations. (TI,117) In this sense, the void is a vanishing mediator through own singularity, which assures the non-relation or unilateral unity between being and thinking, or the multiple and the one. While the conventional philosophy sometimes celebrates or idealizes the power of the void engulfing, the non-philosophy limits and define the ‘void as Being without object or reality’. (AB,78)

The series of potentiality or virtual reserve of withdrawals is situated in the given-without-givenness and manifesting without manifestation. (TI,113) This presence-without-(re)presentation is absolutely separated from all access of human cognitions, which is no longer ascribed to “porous” in the sense of usual philosophy. The One manifests itself within its very withdrawal,
which invents itself potentials of the vision-in-One; envisioning and creating itself as the One in the last instance. The manifestation of this hidden original reality has been often called *chora* in the lineage of western philosophy. *Chora* is not merely a matrix of possible emergence of things but also an absolute giving or givenness by things. In other words, The One is given in/as the absolute withdrawal.(ibid,117) ‘The “withdrawal” of this essence must be conceived of in an absolute way, as a strict irreversibility of the condition to the conditioned’.(BO,29) Then ‘man’s disappearance is not relative or absolute; it is, as we say, radical: *he is withdrawn into himself, into radical immanence, this is his non-consistency or his In-person insistence*.(GV,19)

In this vein, Laruelle assumes attempts of withdrawing and dis-alienating from history.(IP,131)

The intellectual as the clone of victims or the Victim-in-person relapses and withdraws into its capacity of inventing itself from antagonisms which has passed through a variety of conflicts and battles in the historical world. Within this struggle, she becomes infinitely the void and chaos as the process of alternations between appearance and disappearance.(Laruelle, IP,109, Deleuze and Guattari, WP). Man-in-person is not caught in an ambiguity or vague decision as an absolute void. He is simply the radical void unrelated to any kind of empirical or existential decisions and determinations. Put differently, (s)he is becoming a void which is processed through an immanence or immanent milieu. It can be called a void-in-void, not a mere nothingness within the philosophical nihilization.(IP,123) It doesn’t take a decision but struggles constantly in the void of dis/appearance and manifestation-without-manifestation. The intellectual as Victim-in-person in determined and acted through the void. Surprisingly enough, Laruelle recalls here a ‘quasi-Eastern formula’. (IP,109) Even some comparative analysis can be raised between this line of thought and the philosophy of Kyoto school in Japan. But we should not be so hasty. At least, it can be suggested that both Buddhism and OOO (Object-Oriented Ontology) or SR (Speculative Realism) have something in common, an interstitial zone or threshold between things, which is not simply a void or blank hole. The same holds truism for Laruelle’s non-philosophy in its ecological sense of the last instance. In the next section, it would be scrutinized in details.

——Abbreviation of Francois Laruelle’s work


